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Intangible cultural heritage (ICH) ‘includes traditions or living expressions inherited 
from our ancestors and passed on to our descendants, such as oral traditions, 
performing arts, social practices, rituals, festive events, and specific knowledge and 
practices concerning nature and the universe, as well as the knowledge and skills to 
produce traditional crafts’.1 As this working definition demonstrates, ICH is a type of 
living heritage that specific communities create, develop, and maintain often in response 
to environmental conditions and political, economic, and social changes. ICH is 
inextricably connected with people’s lives and constitutes ‘an essential element of the 
identity of its creators and bearers’,2 providing them with a sense of belonging and 
continuity.3  
The safeguarding of ICH can foster cultural resilience, which is defined as the 
capability to rise above challenges and adapt quickly to new circumstances using one’s 
own tradition and cultural background. For example, when a 6.2 magnitude earthquake 
almost destroyed the Italian town of Amatrice on 23 August 2016, Italian restaurants 
across the world made donations for every plate served of pasta all’Amatriciana – the 
pasta dish named after the town. Although the town was largely destroyed, such acts of 
solidarity made ‘the tradition liv[e] on’, and contributed to reconstruction efforts and 
cultural resilience.4 Furthermore, in the aftermath of May 2012 earthquake waves that 
shook North-Eastern Italy, sales of parmigiano reggiano, a type of cheese long produced in 
Parma according to traditional cultural practices, similarly helped the gradual recovery of 
the local communities.5 Cultural resilience empowers individuals not only to survive and 
recover, but also to evolve and even thrive after stressful events.6  
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ICH also denotes a set of ‘fragile … traditions and practices … that … are 
increasingly endangered by modern civilization’.7 While ICH can spread and cross-
pollinate through global migration flows, international trade and foreign investments, 
and thereby promote cultural diversity, it is increasingly perceived to be at risk due to 
the distinct phenomena of economic globalisation and cultural commodification. While 
economic globalisation – the increasing economic integration and interdependence of 
domestic, regional and megaregional economies across the globe – has spurred a more 
intense dialogue and interaction among nations – potentially promoting cultural 
diversity – it can also jeopardise the protection of ICH and associated cultural practices.8 
The expansion of trade in cultural products facilitated by the reduction of trade barriers, 
the increasing food processing and marketing through multinational corporations and 
the development of biotechnology can all affect local cultural practices. Moreover, the 
transformation of traditional cultural practices into profitable economic activities and 
commodities, led by economic globalisation and an emerging cultural globalisation – the 
process of increasing cross-cultural communication, exchange and borrowing due to 
globalisation – can lead to cultural commodification and homogenisation, and even to 
cultural hegemony. Dominant cultures – which also reflect the global distribution of 
power – tend to dominate in the global markets.9 Therefore, as economic globalisation 
and cultural commodification can damage the safeguarding of cultural practices, ‘state 
intervention is required in order to ensure their … continuation’.10 
States have previously brought ICH controversies before the World Trade 
Organization (WTO)11 Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM), where they have claimed 
that regulatory measures affecting their economic interests are in breach of the relevant 
international trade law provisions. Such disputes highlight the emergence of a clash of 
cultures between international economic governance and the safeguarding of 
(intangible) cultural heritage. International economic law fosters a culture that 
emphasises comparative advantage, productivity and economic development, while 
international cultural law emphasises the importance of safeguarding cultural heritage 
for promoting cultural diversity, respecting human rights and promoting peaceful 
relations among nations. This chapter questions whether international law adequately 
protects ICH vis-à-vis economic globalisation and explores how WTO dispute 
settlement bodies deal with ICH, specifically examining whether they consider cultural 
concerns when adjudicating ICH-related disputes, or whether they consider such 
concerns a disguised form of protectionism. In order to address these questions, the 
chapter proceeds as follows. First, it addresses the question of whether international law 
adequately protects ICH vis-à-vis economic globalisation by briefly examining how 
international law governs ICH. After  illustrating the general concept of ICH, the 
chapter discusses and critically assesses the main features, promises and pitfalls of the 
2003 UNESCO Convention on the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage (2003 
                                                          
7 Marilena Alivizatou, ‘Intangible Heritage and Erasure: Rethinking Cultural Preservation and 
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(2008) 3 International Journal of Intangible Heritage 43, 46. 
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Convention).12 The chapter subsequently illustrates the specific ‘clash of cultures’ 
between international economic law and the international, regional and domestic law 
safeguarding various aspects of ICH. Section III specifically examines recent heritage 
wars and critically assesses how WTO dispute settlement bodies deal with ICH, 
investigating whether such bodies take cultural concerns into account when adjudicating 
ICH-related disputes or whether they consider such concerns as a disguised form of 
protectionism. Finally, the chapter draws several preliminary conclusions.  
 
 
CONCEPTUALISING AND SAFEGUARDING INTANGIBLE CULTURAL 
HERITAGE 
 
 The concept of ICH refers to the wealth of cultural traditions and practices passed on 
from one generation to another. It includes practices, representations, expressions, 
knowledge, and skills – as well as the instruments, objects, artefacts and cultural spaces 
associated therewith – that communities, groups and, in some cases, individuals, 
recognize as part of their cultural heritage.13 ICH therefore reflects a given community’s 
response to historical, environmental and social challenges.14 Moreover, as ICH has a 
‘dynamic and changeable nature’,15 its safeguarding requires protecting the significance 
that an object or practice has in the life of a community, rather than protecting a given 
cultural expression or cultural practice per se. 
From the perspective of international law, minority protection treaties have 
incorporated early expressions of ICH safeguarding, and the jurisprudence of the 
Permanent Court of International Justice has touched upon related elements.16 In 
addition, the international community adopted several instruments to protect cultural 
heritage in the aftermath of World War II. However, these instruments focused on the 
protection of tangible heritage.17 It is therefore evident that international law has overall 
largely neglected ICH. This is not to say that there have been no international 
instruments to protect ICH, but that any safeguarding has had an oblique character. In 
fact, a number of international law instruments, such as human rights treaties, have 
indirectly governed aspects of intangible heritage. For example, human rights treaties 
require the protection of cultural rights, which include a respect for ICH.18  
                                                          
12 UNESCO, Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage, Paris, 17 October 
2003, in force 20 April 2006, 2368 UNTS 1 (2003 Convention). 
13 2003 Convention, Art 2. 
14 Paolo Davide Farah and Riccardo Tremolada, ‘Conflict between Intellectual Property Rights and 
Human Rights: A Case Study on Intangible Cultural Heritage’ (2015) 94 Oregon Law Review 125, 137. 
15 Ibid. 138. 
16 Ana F Vrdoljak, ‘Minorities, Cultural Rights and the Protection of Intangible Heritage’, paper presented 
at the European Society for International Law Research Forum on International Law Contemporary 
Issues, Held at the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva on 26–28 May 2005, 1.  
17 Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict with Regulations 
for the Execution of the Convention 1954, The Hague, 14 May 1954, in force 7 August 1956, 249 UNTS 
240; 1972 Convention concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (World 
Heritage Convention), 16 November 1972, in force 17 December 1975, 1037 UNTS 151. 
18 See, inter alia, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 16 December 1966, in 
force 23 March 1976, 999 UNTS 171; 6 ILM 368 (1967), Art 27; International Covenant on Economic, 
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The historic lack of specific instruments for safeguarding ICH is likely due to 
the belief that ICH, as a key element of ‘the cultural and social identity of human 
communities’, would be ‘appropriately preserved and developed at the local level’.19 The 
prevailing assumption has been that ‘the depositaries of ICH’ would ‘transmi[t] to future 
generations the necessary knowledge to preserve and perpetuate their own immaterial 
heritage’, and that there was ‘no need’ for ‘any international action in that respect.’20 
In recent decades, however, it has become evident that ICH demands more 
explicit and specific safeguarding at the international level. Globalisation has intensified 
commerce and intercultural contacts, potentially contributing to the predominance of 
certain cultural models over others.21 In response to such trends, UNESCO has adopted 
specific instruments expressly devoted to the safeguarding of ICH. In 1989, UNESCO 
issued a Recommendation on the Safeguarding of Traditional Culture and Folklore,22 
illustrating policies that countries could implement to preserve their ICH. However, the 
recommendation was a ‘soft’ international instrument and had little impact due to its 
‘top-down’ and ‘state-oriented’ approach,23 focusing on the ‘product’ rather than the 
local communities which produced it.24 Very few states took action in this regard. 
Moreover, many non-European UNESCO member states considered the term ‘folklore’ 
to have derogatory connotations.25 In 2001, the Masterpieces of the Oral and Intangible 
Heritage programme established three rounds of proclamations of certain traditions as 
representative ‘Masterpieces’ in order to raise awareness about intangible heritage, which 
paved the way for the elaboration of the 2003 Convention.26  
The creation of an ICH regime aims to counteract a system that previously 
tended to protect only monumental heritage. The safeguarding of intangible heritage 
through a legally binding instrument also enables non-European countries to bring their 
heritage to the fore.27 The intangible heritage regime can contribute to achieving a 
‘world heritage balance’28 and provides a counter-narrative to the dominant notion of 
material heritage,29 thereby complementing the 1972 World Heritage Convention 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), 16 December 1966, in force 3 January 1976, 993 UNTS 3; 6 ILM 
368 (1967), Art 15. See also Donders and Waelde’s contributions to this collection. 
19 Lenzerini (n 2) 102. See also Lixinski and Blake, in this volume. 
20 Lenzerini ibid. 
21 Ibid.  
22 Recommendation on the Safeguarding of Traditional Culture and Folklore, 15 November 1989, 
http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-
URL_ID=13141&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html?> (accessed on 28 September 
2016). 
23 Richard Kurin, ‘Safeguarding Intangible Cultural Heritage in the 2003 UNESCO Convention: a Critical 
Appraisal’ (2004) Museum International 66, 68. 
24 Alivizatou ‘Contextualising Intangible Cultural Heritage in Heritage Studies and Museology’ (n 10) 46. 
25 ibid.  
26 See Noriko Aikawa-Faure, ‘From the Proclamation of Masterpieces to the Convention for the 
Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage’ in Laurajane Smith and Natsuko Akagawa (eds), Intangible 
Heritage (Routledge 2009). 
27 Lenzerini (n 2) 104.  
28 Gábor Soós, ‘Communities and the Convention for the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage 
(2003) – a New Tool for Development’, in Florent Le Duc (ed), Culture as a Tool for Development. Challenges 
of Analysis and Action (Acted 2009) 29, 34. 
29 Sarah Sargent, ‘Classical Horsemanship and the Dangers of the Emergent Intangible Cultural Heritage 
Authorised Discourse’ (2016) 11 International Journal of Intangible Cultural Heritage 36, 37.  
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(WHC).30 Whereas the WHC requires outstanding universal value for items to be 
inscribed on its list, the ICH regime has a representative list. The ‘shift from 
‘outstanding’ to ‘representative’ fosters comprehensiveness and inclusion’,31 and 
challenges the previously predominant ‘Authorised Heritage Discourse’, which 
privileged Euro-centric, Western and material views of heritage.32 While the WHC 
focuses on ‘static and monumental’ heritage, the ICH regime safeguards ‘dynamic and 
living’ heritage.33 As such, the ICH regime does ‘not envision cultural heritage as a dead 
relic of the past, but as a corpus of processes and practices that are constantly recreated 
and renewed by present generations’.34 Furthermore, while the WHC allows only for 
limited participation of non-state actors, the ICH regime places ‘communities and grass-
roots initiatives at the centre of its activities’,35 enabling ‘a diversity of perspectives’.36 
The ICH regime implicitly recognises that ‘there is no folklore without the folk’,37 and 
that communities shape their ICH as much as ICH shapes their values. Therefore, the 
regime highlights the importance of involving communities in all processes related to 
their ICH.38 
The creation of the ICH regime, however, has raised some questions. For 
example, the question of whether ICH is separate from tangible heritage has been the 
source of extensive debate and scrutiny.39 Scholars have suggested adopting a ‘more 
holistic approach to cultural heritage’ to overcome ‘institutional compartmentalisation 
and polarisation’.40 Critics of the ICH regime have also questioned the effectiveness of 
the listing mechanism, contending that the listing process can be subject to abuse.41 
States can arguably utilise such listing in the pursuit of political, economic and/or other 
non-cultural interests. A certain politicisation is perhaps unavoidable, that is, states often 
list ICH in the pursuit of both cultural and economic goals. However, an excessive 
politicisation of the listing process, i.e., using the listing process for predominantly, if 
not exclusively, purposes beyond cultural goals, risks affecting the functioning of 
international cultural instruments, and endangering, rather than safeguarding, heritage. 
The listing process itself betrays a ‘top-down’ system of creating items and inventories,42 
                                                          
30 Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, 16 November 
1972, in force 17 December 1975, 1037 UNTS 151. 
31 Ned Kaufman, ‘Putting Intangible Heritage in its Place(s): Proposals for Policy and Practice’ (2013) 8 
International Journal of Intangible Cultural Heritage 20, 26. 
32 See generally, Laurajane Smith, Uses of Heritage (Routledge 2006). 
33 Alivizatou (n 10) 47. 
34 Ibid. 48. 
35 Britta Rudolff and Susanne Raymond, ‘A Community Convention? An Analysis of Free, Prior and 
Informed Consent given under the 2003 Convention’ (2013) 8 International Journal of Intangible Heritage 154. 
36 Kaufman (n 31) 29; noting that in fact, ‘heritage debates usually have more than two points of view’. 
37 Alivizatou (n 10) 47. 
38 2003 Convention, Art 15.  
39 See for example, Kaufman (n 31) 20 (arguing that: ‘The regrettable split between tangible and intangible 
heritage specialisations should be brought to an end. Just as many … places owe their importance to 
intangible values, so too are many aspects of intangible heritage grounded in specific places.’) 
40 Alivizatou (n 10) 47. 
41 Sargent (n 29) 42. 
42 Michelle Stefano, ‘Reconfiguring the Framework: Adopting an Ecomuseological Approach for 
Safeguarding Intangible Cultural Heritage’, in Michelle L Stefano, Peter Davis, and Gerard Corsane (eds) 
Safeguarding Intangible Cultural Heritage: Touching the Intangible (Boydell Press 2012) proposing an approach 
that is more centered in the needs of local communities. 
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as it is up to states, not local communities, to nominate items for inscription. Moreover, 
the listing also risks fossilising the dynamic elements of cultural creativity. 
 
 
THE PROMISES AND PITFALLS OF THE 2003 CONVENTION ON THE 
SAFEGUARDING OF THE INTANGIBLE CULTURAL HERITAGE  
 
The 2003 Convention constitutes the principal instrument governing ICH at the 
international level. It defines ICH as ‘the practices, representations, expressions, 
knowledge and skills – as well as the instruments, objects, artefacts and cultural spaces 
associated therewith – that communities, groups and, in some cases, individuals 
recognize as part of their cultural heritage’.43 ‘[T]ransmitted from generation to 
generation’, ICH provides groups and communities with ‘a sense of identity and 
continuity, thus promoting respect for cultural diversity and human creativity’.44 The 
convention considers solely ‘such intangible cultural heritage as is compatible with 
existing international human rights instruments, as well as with the requirements of 
mutual respect among communities, groups and individuals, and of sustainable 
development’.45 Moreover, the convention has been very successful since its inception. 
No state voted against its adoption,46 and it rapidly entered into force. Today the 
convention boasts 178 state parties.47  
The 2003 Convention requires state parties to draw inventories of their ICH and 
to collaborate with local communities on various appropriate means of ‘safeguarding’ 
those traditions.48 The UNESCO Committee established under the 2003 Convention 
oversees two international lists: (1) the list of ‘representative’ intangible cultural heritage 
(‘Representative List of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity’),49 and (2) the list 
of endangered cultural heritage (‘List of Intangible Cultural Heritage in Need of Urgent 
Safeguarding’).50 The former includes, inter alia, the items already designated as 
Masterpieces of Oral and Intangible Heritage by UNESCO and is comparable to the 
World Heritage List. The latter is comparable to the List of World Heritage in danger. 
The 2003 Convention aims to remedy two structural imbalances within 
international law. First, it aims to remedy a gap in global cultural governance, which has 
traditionally favoured the protection of tangible heritage, such as monuments and sites, 
over the protection of intangible heritage. For example, within UNESCO, the 1972 
World Heritage Convention (WHC) has focussed on the conservation of monuments 
                                                          
43 2003 Convention, Art 2(1). 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid.  
46 Kurin (n 23) 66. 
47 List of States Parties to the 2003 Convention, 
<http://www.unesco.org/eri/la/convention.asp?language=E&KO=17116> (accessed on 20 June 2018). 
48 Janet Blake, ‘UNESCO’s 2003 Convention on Intangible Cultural Heritage: The Implication of 
Community Involvement in “Safeguarding”’, in Laurajane Smith and Natsuko Akagawa (eds) Intangible 
Heritage (Routledge 2009). 
49 2003 Convention, Art 16. 
50 Ibid. Art 17. 
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and sites. Only recently has the WHC expanded its purview to comprehend elements of 
intangible heritage. In fact, it now protects mixed forms of cultural heritage, such as 
cultural landscapes, which include both tangible and intangible features.51 Nevertheless, 
the World Heritage List remains imbalanced, including more cultural sites than natural 
or mixed sites.52  
Second, the 2003 Convention aims to counterbalance the regulation of cultural 
resources by international trade law. Globalisation and trade in cultural products can 
potentially promote cultural exchange, but they can also jeopardise local and regional 
cultural practices. The diffusion of a global mass culture has raised the fundamental 
question of whether ‘valuable traditions, practices, and forms of knowledge rooted in 
diverse societies would survive the next generation’.53 In this regard, the 2003 
Convention can counter both the perceived commodification of culture, i.e., its 
reduction to a good or merchandise to be bartered or traded, and the hegemonic 
tendencies of dominant cultures. To do so, the 2003 Convention proposes an alternative 
view that perceives oral traditions and expressions – including music, dance, and theatre 
– and knowledge and practices concerning nature and the universe – e.g., traditional 
medicine and artisanship – as forms of ICH, rather than mere cultural commodities.54 
Moreover, as the ICH Convention sees communities ‘as part and parcel of heritage, not 
only as guardians but also as heritage creators’,55 it inherently shapes safeguarding efforts 
requiring the involvement of the relevant communities. Not only is the ICH convention 
‘more participatory than any other global heritage instrument to date’,56 but it is also 
much more participatory than international trade law. 
Despite its achievements, the 2003 Convention has been criticised because of its 
alleged ‘compromise and vagueness’.57 This chapter suggests that the 2003 Convention 
risks both ‘substantive overreach’58 and procedural underachievement. On the 
substantive level, the definition of ICH is too broad and descriptive,59 risking an 
unwelcome ‘politicization of culture’.60 As many things can fit within the definition of 
                                                          
51 On cultural landscapes, see for example, Valentina Vadi, ‘The Protection of Cultural Landscapes and 
Indigenous Heritage in International Investment Law’, in Laura Westra, Colin Soskolne and Donald 
Spady (eds) Human Health and Ecological Integrity—Ethics, Law and Human Rights (Earthscan 2012) 250–61. 
52 Michael F Brown, ‘Heritage Trouble: Recent Work on the Protection of Intangible Cultural Property’ 
(2005) 12 International Journal of Cultural Property 40–61, 41. 
53 Kurin (n 23) 68. 
54 See for example, Valentina Vadi, ‘Intangible Heritage, Traditional Medicine and Knowledge 
Governance’ (2007) 10(2) Journal of Intellectual Property Law and Practice 682; Silke von Lewinski (ed) 
Indigenous Heritage and Intellectual Property—Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore (Wolters Kluwer 
2008) 510. 
55 Rudolff and Raymond (n 35) 155.) 
56 Ibid. 156. 
57 Marc Jacobs, ‘The Spirit of the Convention – Interlocking Principles and Ethics for Safeguarding 
Intangible Cultural Heritage’ (2016) 11 International Journal of Intangible Cultural Heritage 72, 74. 
58 Tomer Broude, ‘A Diet too Far? Intangible Cultural Heritage, Cultural Diversity, and Culinary Practices’ 
in Irene Calboli and Srividhya Radavan (eds), Protecting and Promoting Diversity with Intellectual Property Law 
(CUP 2015) 3. 
59 See generally, Tullio Scovazzi, Benedetta Ubertazzi and Lauso Zagato (eds) Il Patrimonio culturale 
intangibile nelle sue diverse dimensioni (Giuffré 2012) 93–126; Tullio Scovazzi, ‘La notion de patrimoine culturel 
de l’humanité dans les instruments internationaux’ in James A R Nafziger and Tullio Scovazzi (eds) Le 
patrimoine culturel de l'humanité/ The Cultural Heritage of Mankind (Brill 2008). 
60 Broude (n 58) 3. 
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ICH, there is a significant risk of unwelcome political attempts to list items that in truth 
have very little to do with culture. Meanwhile, on the procedural level, the listing 
approach ‘convert[s] selected aspects of localized … heritage into … the heritage of 
humanity’.61 However, inventories do not do justice to ICH as a living phenomenon; 
rather, they risk creating ‘cultural islands’ that are quarantined from the progression of 
time, atomising culture and freezing its vitality.62 In this sense, ‘fears have been 
expressed that the adoption of measures for the protection of living cultural expressions 
may possibly hinder their further development and make them less relevant to 
contemporary communities’.63 Furthermore, the very effectiveness of such listing is 
controversial, as mere inventories will hardly save ICH.64  
Conflicts and incoordination between the 2003 Convention and other 
international norms – whether customary or conventional – have demonstrated 
additional procedural shortcomings of the 2003 Convention. The interaction between 
the 2003 Convention and other international law regimes raises the general question of 
whether international law is by nature a fragmented system.65 It also raises the specific 
question of whether the protection of ICH should be taken into account in the 
implementation of other international law regimes. It is clear that the protection of 
intangible heritage presents significant overlaps with various fields of international law.66 
Furthermore, the internal convergences between international cultural law instruments 
requires coordination to ensure that no cultural item or expression worthy of protection 
slips through the cracks of the various instruments. However, such coordination does 
not only represent a challenge, but also an opportunity. The fact that international 
cultural instruments all aim at protecting different types of heritage can create synergy 
among the regimes, and ideally reinforce the protection of heritage. The convergence 
among international cultural law instruments is certainly not as problematic as the 
conflict between the 2003 Convention and other instruments of international law, such 
as the covered agreements under the aegis of the WTO.  
The 2003 Convention intersects with several instruments of international trade 
law, which have dramatically different aims and objectives. While the 2003 Convention 
aims to safeguard ICH, international trade law instruments aim to promote free trade. 
Furthermore, while the 2003 Convention does not provide a binding dispute settlement 
mechanism, the WTO is characterised by a compulsory, highly effective and 
sophisticated DSM. As such, when a substantive clash between the promotion of free 
trade and the safeguarding of ICH has arisen, such disputes have been brought before 
the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism. The following section explores cases of trade 
wars, when the protection of ICH clashed with the promotion of free trade. 
                                                          
61 Barbara Kirshenblatt-Gimblett, ‘Intangible Heritage as Metacultural Production’ (2004) 56 Museum 
International 52, 57. 
62 Katja Lubina, ‘Protection and Preservation of Cultural Heritage in the Netherlands in the 21st Century’ 
(2009) 13 Electronic Journal of Comparative Law 1, 50. 
63 Alivizatou (n 10) 47. 
64 Kurin (n 23) 74. 
65 International Law Commission, Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, Fragmentation of 
International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, UN Doc. 
A/CN.4/L.682, 13 April 2006. 
66 On the fuzzy boundaries between tangible and intangible heritage, see Lucas Lixinski, Intangible Cultural 





 INTANGIBLE HERITAGE-RELATED TRADE WARS 
 
Intangible heritage-related trade conflicts and disputes do not have a typical form and 
may relate to diverse areas of international trade law, ranging from international 
intellectual property law to agricultural law. For example, although not all intellectual 
property constitutes intangible heritage, and vice versa,67 there is significant interaction 
between the 2003 Convention and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement).68 The TRIPS Agreement sets 
minimum standards for the protection of several types of intellectual property and is 
administered by the WTO. Meanwhile, the 2003 Convention provides for a 
compatibility clause, stating that none of its provisions can be interpreted as affecting 
‘the rights and obligations of States Parties deriving from any international instrument 
relating to intellectual property rights’.69 The 2003 Convention also lacks specific rules 
over ownership and control over ICH.70 In turn, while the TRIPS Agreement formally 
recognises the non-economic interests associated with intangible assets,71 it is often 
under scrutiny in high-profile cases where it may be difficult to strike the right balance 
between public and private interests.72  
The inability of the TRIPS Agreement to adequately safeguard ICH is 
particularly evident with regard to controversies and disputes related to the patenting by 
multinational corporations of ethnic food or medicine traditionally prepared by local 
communities.73 Without a sensible remodelling, intellectual property rights risk 
overprotecting individual economic interests, while ignoring the collective entitlements 
of the relevant cultural communities.  
A further area of overlap between intangible heritage and intellectual property is 
presented by geographical indications. Geographical indications (GIs) are signs used to 
identify products whose quality, reputation or other characteristics depend on their 
specific geographical origins.74 Examples of GIs include parmigiano reggiano, 
champagne, and gouda. GIs are a possible vector for protecting ICH.75 By protecting 
regional food products that have acquired a strong reputation among consumers and 
                                                          
67 See for example, Daniel Gervais, ‘Spiritual but not Intellectual: The Protection of Sacred Intangible 
Traditional Knowledge’ (2003–2004) 11 Cardozo Journal of International and Comparative Law 633. 
68 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement), 15 April 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 UNTS 299, 33 
ILM 1197 (1994). 
69 2003 Convention, Art 3(b). 
70 Amanda Kearney, ‘Intangible Cultural Heritage (Global Awareness and Local Interest)’ in Laurajane 
Smith and Natsuko Akagawa (eds) Intangible Heritage (Routledge 2009) 209, 216. 
71 See for example, TRIPS Agreement, Arts 7 and 8. 
72 Valentina Vadi, ‘Towards a New Dialectics – Pharmaceutical Patents, Public Health and Foreign Direct 
Investments’ (2015) 5 New York Journal of Intellectual Property and Entertainment Law 1. 
73 Michael Woods, ‘Food for Thought: The Biopiracy of Jasmine and Basmati Rice’ (2002–2003) 13 
Albany Law Journal of Science and Technology 123. 
74 TRIPS Agreement, Art. 22.1. 
75 Dev S Gangjee, ‘Geographical Indications and Cultural Rights: The Intangible Cultural Heritage 




have been produced using centuries-old manufacturing techniques, GIs can indirectly 
protect the ICH associated with the production of these goods. Three dimensions of 
culture are relevant to GIs: (1) the culture of producing a given type of food, (2) the 
culture of consuming certain food and (3) ‘the culture of identity in which a good is 
somehow representative of a group’s cultural identity’.76  
However, there is a transatlantic divide over the protection of GIs. While the 
TRIPS Agreement provides for the protection of GIs in order to avoid misleading the 
public and to prevent unfair competition,77 with limited exceptions,78 its provisions are 
vague. Furthermore, while European states have protected certain foodstuffs originating 
from specific geographical locations since the 15th century,79 other countries led by the 
United States consider GIs as obstacles to trade. The divergent approaches by the US 
and the EU toward the issue of GIs have fostered intense conflicts at various levels. At 
the multilateral level, for example, WTO members are currently debating the adoption 
of a multilateral register for wines and spirits.80 The EU is pushing for an amendment of 
the TRIPS Agreement and the creation of a register with binding effects.81 Other 
countries, led by the United States, are advocating for a non-binding system under 
which the WTO would simply be notified of the members’ respective geographical 
indications.82 Although these negotiations were slotted to be completed in 2003, no 
agreement has been reached on such a system. A parallel issue is the question as to 
whether the higher level of protection currently given to wines and spirits83 should be 
expanded to cover other geographical indications (the so-called GI extension’).84 The 
EU has proposed negotiating the GI extension as part of the agriculture negotiations, 
but other countries remain opposed to such negotiation.85 
This divergence between the EU and the US also played a central role in the 
negotiations around the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) – the 
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free trade agreement between the two actors.86 Although the future of the TTIP remains 
uncertain, the negotiations concerning GIs are particularly interesting, because they 
reflect fundamentally different appreciations of GIs. While the EU wanted to prevent 
American producers from commercialising and labelling products bearing their GI-
protected names, the US favoured free trade.87 This lack of protection – the European 
negotiators argued – allows an unacceptable exploitation of European intangible 
heritage, and affects the economic interests of European producers. The US negotiators 
conversely contended that such names have become generic, and therefore cannot be 
protected as GIs. Moreover, EU-style legal protection would constitute a barrier to 
trade, allow monopolies and ultimately increase final prices for consumers. Finally, the 
US negotiators posited that the EU system would be unfair because European 
immigrants in the New World have long produced such products, thus sharing the same 
ICH of their countries of origin. Denying them the possibility to commercialise their 
products using the traditional names for indicating such items would deny their rightful 
association with a specific production process and cultural practice.  
Beyond its evident economic component, the continuing debate over GIs also 
has a cultural character. In fact, proponents of GIs consider food as something more 
than a tradable commodity: as an artefact characterised by both visible features and 
intangible cultural qualities related to the traditional manufacturing processes and place 
of origin. In other words, ‘as a forged painting and the original one may not differ at all 
materially, while still being quite different artworks, in the same way a GI cannot be 
equated to its material constitution: some aspects of its making are key to its identity’.88  
The interaction between international economic law and the protection of 
intangible heritage also includes additional areas of trade. For example, the EU ban on 
the commercialisation of seal products caused a cultural skirmish across the Atlantic.89 
As Europeans perceive the hunting of seals to be morally objectionable, the EU banned 
the trade of seal products except those derived from hunts traditionally conducted by 
the Inuit and other indigenous communities for cultural and subsistence reasons (IC 
condition).90 Seals constitute the most important component of an Inuit diet,91 and 
indigenous hunting practices represent a form of ICH deemed essential to preserve the 
indigenous way of life. 
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In response to the EU ban, Canada and Norway brought claims against the EU 
before the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), contending that the EU seal regime 
was inconsistent with the EU’s obligations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade 1994 (GATT 1994),92 and under the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) 
Agreement.93 Canada and Norway specifically argued, inter alia, that the indigenous 
communities (IC) condition violated the non-discrimination obligation under Article I:1 
and III:4 of the GATT 1994. According to Canada and Norway, such conditions afford 
seal products from Canada and Norway less favourable treatment than that afforded to 
like seal products of domestic origin, as well as those of other foreign origin, in 
particular from Greenland.94 In fact, the majority of seals hunted in Canada and Norway 
would not qualify under the IC exception, while most, if not all, of Greenlandic seal 
products would satisfy such requirements.95 The panel and the Appellate Body held, 
inter alia, that the exception provided for indigenous communities under the EU seal 
regime afforded more favourable treatment to seal products produced by indigenous 
communities than that afforded to like domestic and foreign products,96 in breach of 
Articles I:1 and III:4 of the GATT 1994. The panel referred to the various instruments 
which protect indigenous cultural practices at the international law level,97 including the 
2007 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP).98 
However, the panel concluded that the design and application of the IC measure were 
not even-handed, because the IC exception was available de facto to Greenland.99 Both 
the Appellate Body and the panel were very careful in noting that the EU was pursuing 
a legitimate objective; they only censored the way in which the EU was pursuing the 
selected goal. This case is significant as it shows that states can adopt exceptions to 
favour the safeguarding of ICH. At the same time, they must ensure that the adopted 
measures do not discriminate across countries.  
An additional sector in which the cultural clash between free trade and 
intangible heritage occurs is agriculture. The WTO’s Agreement on Agriculture,100 which 
governs domestic support, market access and export subsidies in the agricultural sector, 
is based on the market liberalisation model and efficiency criteria.101 It requires WTO 
members to convert non-tariff barriers to tariffs, lower tariff barriers to trade and 
reduce export subsidies. By gradually reducing the protections available for domestic 
agricultural sectors, the agreement does ‘not allow farmers to maintain their current 
methods of production solely on cultural or environmental grounds, if those methods 
prevent the farmers from efficiently adjusting their production in line with market 
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forces’.102 Rather, the WTO regards agriculture ‘as an economic sector like any other 
industrial sector’.103 In some countries, the liberalisation of the market – opening certain 
markets to highly subsidised agriculture – has meant that local farmers have to compete 
with heavily subsidised imports.104 Competition has driven prices down and forced these 
farmers out of business. This phenomenon has also touched products that are central to 
a country’s culture.105 For example, the influx of highly subsidised corn from the US has 
undermined the ability of Mexican farmers to grow corn, a crop that Mexicans have 
cultivated for centuries.106 Corn is an essential component of traditional Mexican cuisine 
that is inscribed on the Representative List of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of 
Humanity.107  
A further area of cultural resistance in which the clash between free trade and 
cultural attitudes is particularly evident is food safety. The WTO Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Agreement108 addresses the interest of member states in assuring that their 
citizens are supplied with safe food, encouraging member states to base sanitary and 
phytosanitary measures on internationally accepted scientific standards.109 However, 
conflicts have arisen with regard to the interpretation of scientific evidence. While the 
precautionary approach to risk management is a general principle of EU law – ruling 
that given products are prohibited until they are proven safe – on the other side of the 
Atlantic, products must conversely be proven unsafe to be banned. These different 
approaches to risk and food safety – based on different cultural approaches to food 
production – have given rise to a number of disputes at the WTO concerning 
hormones, genetically modified organisms (GMOs) and other issues. Furthermore, trade 
experts tend to consider safety regulations and cultural concerns to be forms of 





Given its importance for human subsistence, resilience and flourishing, intangible 
heritage is at the heart of civilisations. It plays a role in shaping the specific identity of 
communities and individuals alike. The safeguarding of the processes and practices of 
intangible heritage has required the adoption of an ad hoc instrument: the 2003 
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Convention.110 Despite some achievements, the 2003 Convention is largely characterised 
by substantive overreach and procedural underachievement. Not only does it fail to 
ensure adequate safeguarding of intangible heritage, marking a ‘de facto soft law 
instrument in formal hard law clothing’,111 but it also fails to provide a meaningful 
forum to address ICH-related disputes.  
The approach endorsed by the 2003 Convention clashes with international 
economic governance, which is conversely characterised by substantive 
underachievement and procedural overreach. The WTO is a legally binding and highly 
effective regime that demands states to promote and facilitate free trade. The WTO 
system governs international trade based on a free-market paradigm.112 It is therefore 
not interested in local communities and their intangible cultural heritage. Rather, the 
WTO system conceptualises such issues as non-economic concerns, relegated to the 
margins of the regime.113 Nevertheless, although the WTO-covered agreements do not 
purposely regulate ICH, and instead assumedly touch upon it in a rather indirect 
fashion, economic activities regulated under the WTO agreements can (and have) 
affect(ed) the aims and objectives of the 2003 Convention.  
Intangible heritage trade disputes are generally characterised by the need to 
balance the protection of intangible heritage and the promotion of free trade. Many 
such controversies arise during trade negotiations or are brought before the WTO 
Dispute Settlement Mechanism. The WTO panels do not have a specific mandate to 
assess the cultural implications of the disputes they are adjudicating. It is therefore no 
surprise that trade ‘courts’ have paid little attention to the cultural aspects of trade 
disputes. Nonetheless, intangible cultural heritage matters, and the existence of such 
disputes, can provoke a necessary and sustained reflection on whether international law 
is indeed a fragmented system by nature, or whether there are tools to promote better 
coordination among its various subfields. 
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